General Edward Braddock, the British commander in North America, planned a coordinated offensive that would drive the French out of the American frontier and back into Canada. He decided to begin with capturing Fort Duquesne, now downtown Pittsburgh, and then work his way up to the New York Canadian border, capturing French forts one by one until he got to Fort Niagara. He had a force of 2100 regulars and militia at his disposal, but his attempts to recruit Native allies had been a failure. The Natives in the area and along his line of march were waiting to see his success before they decided to join. Thus, Braddock had only 8 Mingo scouts under Lieutenant John Fraser, and George Washington, who knew the area and was serving as a volunteer aide-de-camp. The expedition set out from Fort Cumberland, in Maryland, weighed down by cannon and a heavy supply train. Among the teamsters for the supply wagon were Daniel Boone and Daniel Morgan. William Crawford of the Battle of Sandusky fame was an Ensign. Future Revolutionary War generals Washington, Charles Lee, and Horatio Gates were serving with the British. As the baggage train impeded their progress, Braddock divided his forces. He would push ahead with 1400 men in what was called then a flying column, moving with minimal supplies and maximum speed. 800 men would stay behind and move the baggage along as best they could. Braddock's advance met small skirmish parties of French and Indians along the way, but nothing that the English superiority in numbers and tight discipline couldn't handle, giving them a false sense of security.
Meanwhile, at Fort Duqesne, Indian scouts were brining in word of the large British force. The French commander Claude-Pierre de Pecaudy de Contrecoeur, had less than a thousand men at his disposal. He knew he couldn't withstand a siege, especially if cannon were involved. He decided to launch a preemptive strike and trap the British at the Monongahela River. The Native contingent, mostly Ottawas, Ojibwes and Potawatomis were reluctant to fight this much larger force. The French field commander, Daniel-Lienard de Beaujeu tried to hearten them by dressing in full regalia, complete with paint. On July 8, 1755, as the confrontation loomed, the Natives with Beaujeu sent a delegation to Braddock's chief of scouts, Lieutenant Fraser, requesting a parly. Whether this was on their own initiative or with the knowledge and say-so of Beaujeu is not clear. The Natives requested that Braddock halt his force and allow the French to withdraw from Duquesne. Fraser and Washington were all for the idea, but Braddock insisted on plodding ahead. The next day, Braddock's men crossed the Monongahela about ten miles south of Fort Duquesne, without opposition.
Braddock sent an advance party of 300 men with two cannon under Thomas Gage ahead of his main column. All the while, Washington was becoming more nervous. The British were using open field techniques in rough, densely forested terrain, where the enemy could be everywhere without them knowing it. Braddock continued to disregard Washington's warnings. Just as Washington suspected would happen sooner or later, Gage's advance force stumbled on the French, who were behind schedule and hurrying toward the River to set an ambush. They were too late and the forces ran straight into each other. Beaujeu was killed by the first volley and over 100 Canadian militia unnerved and headed back to Fort Duquesne. Beaujeu's lieutenants, Jean-Daniel Dumas and Charles de Langlade, quickly rallied their men. While the French skirmished with the British advanced party, their Native allies moved into the trees and began to fire from cover. It is from this action that many people believe the Battle of the Monongahela was a Native ambush. Gage's men fell back, taking fire all the way. They collided and bunched up with Braddock's main force further back along the road. As the Natives and remaining Canadian Militia, who were familiar with this style of fighting, surrounded Braddock's panicking men, the French kept pressure on the front of the column, forcing it back on itself. Following Braddock's example, his officers tried to form their men in dressed ranks to meet the assault. The American militia, having none of that, moved to positions of cover and began trading fire with the enemy. Unfortunately, the British became confused as to who was Canadian and who was American and shot some of their own militia. This chaos continued until Braddock was shot off his horse and Washington could assume command.
Washington formed a rear guard of experienced militia who were used to the terrain and the style of fighting. This allowed Braddock's remaining officers to get their men back along the road toward the supply column. They had to leave behind wounded and dying, who were to meet a grim fate soon enough. Only Braddock was bundled up and taken along with the retreat. Washington estimated the force facing them to be about 300, mostly Native. Of the approximately 1400 men Braddock had led into this fiasco, 456 were killed and over 422 wounded. The loss was most apparent among the officers, who were often shot first by the enemy in an attempt to disorganize the men. Colonel Dunbar, the leader of the supply train, took command of the survivors. He ordered the destruction of most of his supplies, fearing pursuit by the supposedly still much larger French force up the road. No one in the British command had any idea at the time just how small the force was hat had badly beaten them.
The French did not pursue the British, understanding that they were still outnumbered. While the Native contingent looted the battlefield and took scalps, the French prepared to regroup and head back to Fort Duquesne. From that day and forward, people on all sides of the conflict tried to come to grips with how a large, disciplined British force, made up mostly of regulars with some militia and no Native contingent to speak of, had been so thoroughly decimated by a smaller primarily Native, French-lead force. While the simplistic answer is that Braddock formed his men and didn't allow them to fight 'American style', the truth was that European armies had known about and had methods to counter partisan strikes similar to what this was. Braddock hadn't used those methods either. His men treated this battle as an open field battle where they believed they had the upper hand. The mostly Native force on the French side showed them the error of their ways. It was a lesson the British still hadn't learned twenty years later, at Lexington and Concord, when the Americans dealt them another bloody retreat courtesy of 'American style' fighting learned largely from Natives.
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